Introduction
The attachment of the American Indian to the land historically has been a focal point in tribal cultures and a cornerstone in Indian traditions, religions, and values. As described by a contemporary Hopi Indian, inherent in this emphasis on the importance of the land is the realization that land serves as "sacred monuments to the past" and provides "the continuity which insures survival of their culture as a people."' In concurrence with this view, the Final Report of the American Indian Policy Review Commission, submitted to Congress in 1977, reaffirms the central role land plays in both the tribal and individual Indian way of life by its observation that " [t] he overwhelming conviction of Indian people is that an adequate tribal land base is essential. Their economic security and development of tribal economies depend on it; the very survival of Indian cultures.., depend on it. ' ' 2 This concern over protecting what remains of the Indian land base is not unwarranted. From 1936 through 1974, during a period in which the official federal policy was to encourage the consolidation of the Indian land base, a total of 1,811,010 acres of tribal land were taken by the federal government through condemnation proceedings.' The land loss due to state condemnation is not known. Future diminution of Indian land by condemnation may be augmented, moreover, by the fact that the remaining 53 million acres 4 of Indian land contain great mineral © 1983 Blake A. Watson wealth. 5 The attraction of both government and industry to these abundant energy resources and the concomitant development of the surrounding areas will inevitably necessitate condemnation of rights-of-way for pipelines, power lines, and access roads, resulting in a further reduction of the Indian land base.
It is thus quite apparent that the applicability of the federal and state powers of eminent domain to Indian lands is of prime importance and carries far-reaching ramifications. This article will examine the origin, the nature, and the extent of state 6 condemnation of Indian lands.' The article, however, will not examine the question of compensation under the fifth amendment for takings of Indian land by the federal government.
In particular, the focus will be on (1) which types of Indian lands are subject to state condemnation (and, by negative inference, which types are not); (2) the statutory scheme by which the federal government has granted the states authority to condemn Indian land; and (3) the various issues that have arisen under the statutes and have required judicial interpretation, including whether state or federal jurisdiction obtains over state condemnation of Indian land, the extent to which the statutes in question waive the sovereign immunity of the federal government, and whether the United States should be an indispensable partydefendant in such condemnation suits. Finally, an examination will be made of the issue put forth in the 1980 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Clarke '-whether a state may "inversely" condemn Indian land, and the issue addressed in several recent Bureau of Indian Affairs), cited in Ferguson, Jr., Industry Problems with the Emerging Tribal Role, in INSTITUTE ON INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, Paper 11, p. 1.
5.
The wealth of Indian resources is both wide and deep: "It is estimated that Indian land coal could provide more than one-tenth of the nation's future coal needs. Based upon Atomic Energy Commission estimates, it is believed that uranium reserves located on Indian land constitute about two-thirds of the reserves on federal lands." Id., citing Bureau of Competition, Report to the Federal Trade Commission on Leasing on Indian Lands 11, 17 (Oct. 1975).
6. Although the term "state" will be used throughout this article, it should be recognized that states, as sovereigns, "may delegate the power of eminent domain to administrative officers or other agencies of the sovereign and to public and private corporations." 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.1[2] (3d ed. 1973). The most common beneficiaries of such delegated authority are municipalities and power arid communication companies.
7. Although the focus of this article is on state condemnation of Indian land, the issue of whether a tribal government may condemn Indian land is also briefly discussed. See infra notes 66, 83.
8. 445 U.S. 253 (1980) .
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lower court decisions-whether the specific Indian right-of-way statutes and the general condemnation provision constitute alternative methods available to states for the acquisition of rights-ofway across certain types of Indian land.
I. Types of Indian Land
Real property interests can vest in or be acquired by Indians in a variety of ways, each affecting differently the applicability and reach of the particular (federal or state) eminent domain power asserted. Because of the important distinctions and limitations that emanate from the nature of Indian land subject to condemnation, it is necessary to first become familiar with the various ways by which tribes and individual Indians may acquire and hold real property.
Historical Background
American Indians historically had no concept of private ownership of land but instead followed a system of tenure of land for the perpetual use and occupancy by the tribe. 9 Indian and nonIndian cultures thus held significantly divergent views concerning their relative uses of and relationships to the land. Whereas the white man had an extremely well-defined body of property law based on clear-cut notions of individual ownership with concomitant rights and responsibilities, Indian tribes generally held land communally and shared benefits and burdens.'" These differing views, placed in the context of the historical relations between the white man and the Indian, have contributed greatly to the unique stature Indian lands presently hold within the general body of property law.
One particular reason the general principles of real property do The distinction is of some significance: whereas under a theory of tenancy in common descendants of tribal members who are not themselves members of a tribe would be entitled to share in the common property of the tribe (including, presumably, any proceeds resulting from an exercise of the power of eminent domain), no such claim would arise with respect to tribal property. COHEN, supra, at 288 (1971 ed.)
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AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW not fully apply in the context of Indian-held lands is found in the guardian-ward or trust relationship that exists between the United States and Indian tribes and, in certain circumstances, individual Indians."I Under this doctrine, legal title to Indian tribal lands is held in the name of the United States in trust for the tribe, which retains the beneficial incidents or equitable title to the property. 2 Hence, " [t] ribal property is neither public domain of the United States nor the private property of the tribal members."' 3 In addition to tribal property, certain lands that have been allotted 4 to individual Indians are also held by the United States in trust. It is with regard to these individual allotments that the question arises whether the United States, because of its trustee capacity, should be deemed an indispensable party-defendant in state condemnation proceedings.I 5
Tribal Property
The term "tribal land" has been defined as "lands held by the United States in trust for a tribe, or title to which is in the Indian tribe subject to federal restrictions against alienation or encumbrance . . . [including] all unallotted or unpatented 6 reservation lands, as well as non-reservation lands acquired by the tribe." 7 Beyond this definition, Indians also have asserted tribal property rights based on aboriginal possession.
Aboriginal Indian Title
Aboriginal title (or "original" Indian title) is based on the exclusive use, occupancy, and possession from "time immemorial."
11. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (Marshall, J.) ("[The Indians'] relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian"). (1977) 20. Congress prohibited the future use of the treaty power in Indian affairs in 1871. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976). The prohibition was in part a response to the fact that treaties in the past had often operated to transfer large amounts of Indian land outside the public domain to non-Indian purchasers. Critics of this method of land transfer feared that the treaty-making process would be increasingly used to circumvent public land law restrictions. P. GATES 24. Two alternative theories have been put forth as "sources" for the assumption by a state of power over an Indian tribe in face of the presumption of constitutionally mandated paramount federal power in the area of Indian affairs. The first of these theories, applicable only to the original thirteen colonies, is that these states possess a "sovereign
P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETERICH & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 125

19821
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
[Vol. 10 ject without qualification" 5 to the eminent domain power of the state.
Individually Owned Indian Lands
Although Indians have traditionally adhered to notions of communal ownership of land, through a historical process of interaction with and imposition of the white man's laws, the concept of individual Indian ownership of real property has arisen. The process came about primarily through a series of statutes authorizing allotments of lands to individual tribal members, 6 and was prompted by a desire to assimilate the Indian into the mainstream of the dominant white culture. 27 This movement toward assimilation culminated in the General Allotment Act of power . . . over Indian lands independent of and never surrendered to, the Federal government, derived from its status as one of the ... colonies." Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. 26. Lavell & Back, supra note 9, at 7. 27. The history of the allotment movement is set forth in D. OTIS, THE DAwEs Acr AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (1973). The primary objection to the allotment movement centered on its destructive effect on the Indian land base. The allotment statutes generally provided that "surplus" unallotted lands-those reservation lands remaining after allotment-could be purchased by the United States and distributed to settlers, with the proceeds to be held in trust for the Indians. Largely as a result of this policy, Indian landholdings were reduced from 137 million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in 1934. 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REviEw COMM'N, supra note 2.
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1887,28 which provided for allotment of lands to individual Indians on any reservation and on lands of the United States under certain specified circumstances. 2 9 In addition to lands disbursed to individual Indians pursuant to the General Allotment Act, the term "allotted lands" includes individual allotments issued pursuant to provisions in specific treaties or statutes dealing with particular tribes. 3 0 Allotments were issued by two methods, both designed to prevent the individual Indian "from improvidently disposing of [the] allotted lands." 3 The first method involved the issuance of a patent to the allottee conveying the land in fee, subject to a restriction upon its alienation for a twenty-five-year period, which could be extended. 3 ' The present status of Indian allotment laws has been affected by the enactment of the Indian Reorganization (WheelerHoward) Act of 1934,11 which stopped the allotment of Indian lands in order to end the diminution of the Indian land base caused by the sale of "surplus" unallotted lands 38 and the fractionalization of allotments caused by the process of intestate succession. 3 9 The laws of allotment continue to apply, however, to members of tribes not electing to accept the Act, unless the contrary is specifically provided. 40 more specific provisions allowing states to acquire, without resort to legal action, rights-of-way across both reservation and allotted lands for particular purposes and under specific conditions. The procedure by which rights-of-way are acquired under these more specific provisions differs from the section 357 judicial condemnation procedure. The rights-of-way are granted pursuant to administrative regulations 4 6 under the aegis of the Secretary of the Interior, 47 whose consent is required. 48 The regulations, which are authorize condemnation only upon a showing that it was in the best interest of the Indian allottee, noting that: "Section 357, in allowing condemnation for public purposes, carries out such right for the benefit of the public as a whole." Id. § 1505, and held that the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to the claims. Id. at 2965-67, 2969-72. The Court, which noted that its interpretation of the statutes in question was reinforced by the existence of the general federal-Indian trust relationship, summarized its decision as follows: Because the statutes and regulations at issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the Government in the management and operation of Indian lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained. Given the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties. Id. at 2972-73.
II. Indian Land and Allocation of the
48. The contours of this consent requirement have been further delineated with respect to 25 U.S.C. § 311 (1976) (public highways). In United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206 (1943), the Supreme Court held that a road established pursuant found in part 169 of Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations, "prescribe the procedures, terms and conditions under which rights-of-way over and across tribal land, individually owned land, and Government owned land may be granted." '49 The right-of-way provisions can be further distinguished from the section 357 judicial condemnation procedure by their number. Congress has provided for rights-of-way across Indian lands for specific purposes since 1875, and many of the treaties of the nineteenth century also made provisions for rights-of-way.° Rightsof-way may be obtained for, among other things, railroads, 5 ' to section 311 across allotted land was governed by state law and that the state could permit maintenance of electric service lines on the right-of-way without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary's regulations furnish little in the way of standards for granting rightsof-way. As the leasing regulations do, the regulations governing rights-of-way recite that consideration "shall be not less than the appraised fair market value," plus any severance damages for the remaining lands [25 C.F.R. § 169.12 (1983)]. Unlike leases, however, rights-of-way are not subject to periodic reappraisal and revision of annual payments, which seems insufficient in view of the fifty-year or perpetual tenure of most rights-of-way lid. Prior to the 1899 Act railroad rights-of-way were granted piecemeal, either by treaty provision ... or by special statute providing for compensation to the Secretary for the benefit of the Indians .... Occasionally a tribe was paid directly .... Other acts simply stated that tribes should be paid without specifying how. ... The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and empowered to grant a right of way, in the nature of an easement, for the construction, operation, and maintenance of telephone and telegraph lines and offices for general telephone and telegraph business through any Indian reservation .... or through any lands which have been allotted in severalty to any individual Indian.. . but which have not been conveyed to the allottee with full power of alienation, upon the terms and conditions herein expressed. No such lines shall be constructed across Indian lands . . . until authority therefore has first been obtained from the Secretary of the Interior .... The compensation to be paid the tribes in their tribal capacity and the individual allottees for such right of way.., shall be determined in such manner as the Secretary of the Interior may direct, and shall be subject to his final approval ....
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[ The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and empowered to grant a right-of-way in the nature of an easement for the construction, operation, and maintenance of pipe lines for the conveyance of oil and gas ... through any lands which have been allotted in severalty to any individual Indian... but which have not been conveyed to the allottee with full power of alienation upon the terms and conditions herein expressed .... The compensation to be paid the tribes in their tribal capacity and the individual allottees for such right of way ... shall be determined in such manner as (1983) . Pipeline companies may also have power to condemn tribal lands pursuant to section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1976) , which provides that a natural gas company holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity can acquire necessary rights-of-way through the exercise of the right of eminent domain where an agreement with the owner of the property cannot otherwise be reached. The applicability of section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act to rights-of-way across tribal lands has not been addressed by the courts.
54 The head of the department having jurisdiction over the lands be, and he is, authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to grant an easement for rights-of-way, for a period not exceeding fifty years from the date of the issuance of such grant, over, across, and upon the public lands and reservations of the United States for electrical poles and lines for the transmission and distribution of electrical power, and for poles and lines for communication purposes, and for radio, television, and other forms of communication transmitting, relay, and receiving structures and facilities ... to any citizen, association, or corporation of the United States, ... Provided, That such right-of-way shall be allowed within or through any Indian or any other reservation only upon the approval of the chief officer of the department under whose supervision or control such reservation falls, and upon a finding by him that the same is not incompatible with the public interest: Provided further, That all or any part of such right-of-way may be forfeited and annulled by declaration of the head of the department having jurisdiction over the lands for nonuse for a period of two years or for abandonment . The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to permit the use of rights of way through the public lands, forest, and other reservations of the United States ... for electrical plants, poles, and lines for the generation and distribution of electrical power, and for telephone and telegraph purposes, and for canals, ditches, pipes and pipelines, flumes, tunnels, or other water conduits, and for water plants, dams, and reservoirs used to promote irrigation or mining or quarrying, or the manufacturing or cutting of timber or lumber, or the supplying of water for domestic, public, or any other beneficial uses to the extent of the ground occupied by such canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, reservoirs, or other water conduits or water plants, or electrical or other works permitted hereunder ... by any citizen, association, or corporation of the United States. . Provided, That such permits shall be allowed within or through any of said parks or any forest, military, Indian, or other reservation only upon the approval of the chief officer of the department under whose supervision such park or reservation falls and upon a finding by him that the same is not incompatible with the public interest: Provided further, That all permits given hereunder for telegraph and telephone purposes shall be subject to the provisions of sections 1 to 6 and 8 of title 47, regulating rights of way for telegraph companies over the public domain: And provided further, That any permission given by the Secretary of the Interior under the provisions of this section may be revoked by him or his successor in his discretion, and shall not be held to confer any right, or easement, or interest in, to, or over any public land, reservation, or park. Section 959 does not apply to allotted Indian lands. See note 55 supra. Section 311 on its face does not require the Secretary to obtain the consent of tribes before granting permission to states to acquire rights-of-way across reservations for In order to simplify these right-of-way provisions, Congress passed the 1948 Indian Right of Way Act. 9 This Act empowers the Secretary of the Interior to "grant rights-of-way for all purposes, subject to such conditions as he may prescribe," 6 and subject to the condition that "just" compensation be paid." Tribal consent is a prerequisite to the grant of any right-of-way over tribal lands under the Act, with the consent requirement in the case of individually owned Indian land being waived only in limited and specified circumstances. Except when waived in writing by the landowners and approved by the Secretary, consideration for rights-of-way granted or renewed "shall be not less than but not limited to the fair market value of the rights granted, plus severance damages, if any, to the remaining estate." 25 C. With regard to tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act, the necessity of obtaining tribal consent appears to be also required by 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: ... to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe... Brief for Intervenor at 24 n.13. In this particular instance the argument was that section 324 of the 1948 Act imported its consent requirement in section 311 and thus "amended" it. This interpretation was drawn from an Interior Department decision, which held that section 326 does not bar the imposition of the section 324 consent requirement as a "quasi-amendment" to the 1899 right-of-way Act (25 U.S.C. § § 312-18 (1976)). The Court did not address this issue in its opinion. The "quasi-amendment" theory, if ac-was intended to serve as a supplement and alternative to the earlier right-of-way provisions." Others have argued that the earlier right-of-way provisions were intended only to remain in effect during a period of transition from the old to the new system and were otherwise repealed by implication. As noted previously, section 357 is phrased as a general grant of federal authority; it has been left to the courts to define and resolve the specific jurisdictional and procedural problems peculiar to these state condemnation proceedings. In particular, the courts have focused on three problem areas: the locus of jurisdiction, the effect of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity on these actions, and the related question of whether the United States is an indispensable party in such proceedings." 66. Although examined in the context of state condemnation proceedings, the jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and indispensable party issues apply with equal force to tribal condemnation proceedings, assuming that the power of tribal governments to condemn exists. These issues were addressed by the Eighth Circuit in Fredericks v. Mandel, 650 F.2d 144 (8th Cir. 1981). In that case the beneficial owner of a trust allotment brought an action in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a tribal court order that purported to condemn a portion of the trust allotment as a public right-of-way. The court held that under the rationale of Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939) (see infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text), the tribal court was without jurisdiction to condemn or to grant the right-of-way because such a suit must be brought in federal court and must join the United States as a party. 67 The state of Minnesota had commenced a condemnation action in state court to appropriate for highway purposes certain trust allotments held by individual Chippewa Indians. The condemnation petition named the United States as a party defendant, alleging that the United States held the fee in trust. The action was then removed by stipulation to federal district court, wherein a motion to dismiss was filed by the United States on the grounds that (1) the United States was an indispensable party to the condemnation proceeding; (2) it had not given its consent to be sued; and (3) the state court originally had no jurisdiction over the action. 68 The Supreme Court agreed that the United States, by virtue of its ownership of the fee to the Indian allotted lands, 9 was an indispensable party and affirmed the dismissal of the proceeding on the basis of the state court's original lack of jurisdiction over the suit. In reaching its decision, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis, established that the locus of jurisdiction for actions brought under section 357 is exclusively in the federal courts. After noting that "it rests with Congress to determine not only whether the United States may be sued, but in what courts the suit may be brought," ' 7 ' Justice Brandeis pointed out that, although section 357 authorizes state condemnation for "any public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where of eminent domain does exist, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, coupled with the indispensability of the United States as a party-defendant, may nevertheless bar tribal condemnation suits. The Supreme Court's holding in Minnesota v. United States, supra, that section 357 confers by implication the necessary consent to be sued, however, should apply to tribal as well as state condemnation. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. As noted by the court in Fredericks v. Mandel, section 357 "does not distinguish between Indian and non-Indian condemnors." 650 F.2d at 145 n.2.
67. 305 U.S. 382 (1939). 68. Id. at 384. 69. "As the United States owns the fee of these parcels, the right of way cannot be condemned without making it a party." Id. at 386. While the Court stressed the fact that the United States held legal title to the trust allotments in question, it also intimated that the same result should follow with respect to restricted allotments, in which the fee is in the allottee, subject to restraints on alienation. [Vol. 10
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located," 7 2 the words of the statute contain no permission to sue in state courts. 73 To support the conclusion of exclusive federal jurisdiction, Justice Brandeis relied on the fact that the subject of section 357-allotted Indian lands-is a subject within the exclusive control of the federal government. 4 The second problem addressed by the Minnesota Court concerned the effect of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity on section 357. Under this doctrine, a state or any other party may not maintain a suit against the United States without its consent unless authorized by Congress. In Minnesota the Court held that section 357, by permitting state condemnation, confers by implication the necessary authorization to sue the United States in the federal courts. 7 s
The holding that section 357 impliedly confers consent to state condemnation suits in federal courts takes on added significance when it is examined in connection with the third problem addressed in Minnesota: the question of whether the United States must be named as an indispensable party-defendant in such state condemnation actions. Without the Court's finding of implied consent, the doctrine of sovereign immunity could serve as a potential bar to all state condemnation actions if the United States were deemed an indispensable party to the proceeding. 76 Even with the finding of implied consent in section 357 actions, the indispensable party issue remains important with regard to the procedural aspects of the condemnation proceeding. The indispensability of the United States as a party in suits brought under section 357 has been viewed as an important component of the guardian-ward doctrine 77 that permeates the federal-Indian relationship. Indeed, it has been held that it is the presence of In the "typical" section 357 condemnation proceeding, however, the United States will be deemed an indispensable party and must be joined.
In addition to the question of whether the United States must be joined as an indispensable party, an argument has been raised that the Secretary of the Interior is also an indispensable party in a section 357 condemnation action. This argument, however, was rejected in Transok Pipeline Co. 
III. Remaining Issues in the Area of State Acquisition of Interests in Indian Lands
Aside from the procedural issues discussed above with respect to what steps must be taken and what safeguards must be afforded before a state may condemn an allotment or acquire a right-of-way, there remain several unresolved questions with regard to the structural interplay among the various provisions that comprise the federal statutory and administrative scheme in these areas. In particular, the following questions have appeared:
(1) whether the concept of inverse condemnation, found in the general law of eminent domain, applies in the specialized area of condemnation of Indian lands, and (2) whether the general grant of authority to states 8 3 to condemn "for any public purpose" found in section 357 may be used to acquire rights-of-way across allotted lands as an alternative to the more specific and detailed Indian right-of-way statutes. 84 An opportunity to address and further delineate these issues was presented to the United States Supreme Court in the 1980 case of United States v. Clarke. 85 The immediate issue before the Court in Clarke concerned the former question, i.e., whether section 357 encompassed the general principle of "inverse condemnation ' 816 recognized elsewhere in the field of eminent domain. In deciding this issue, however, the Court declined to address the additional question of whether the specific right-of-way provisions preclude states from acquiring rights-of-way across allotted lands by condemnation under section 357. Several lower courts, however, have recently addressed this issue.
Inverse Condemnation and Section 357
Facts of Clarke
The question before the Supreme Court in Clarke was whether a state may "inversely" condemn allotted Indian land under section 357. In 1956, Bertha Mae Tabbytite, an Indian, filed a homestead application with the Department of the Interior for a 83. Assuming that the power of tribal governments to condemn exists, it would appear that tribes as well as states could utilize section 357 as an alternative method of acquiring rights-of-way across allotted lands. See note 66 supra. 
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AMERICAN INDIA N LA W REVIEW 160-acre plot of land in the Chugach Mountains southeast of Anchorage, Alaska.1 7 Two years later the defendant Glen Clarke applied for a homestead on an adjoining 80-acre parcel. To secure access to a public highway, Clarke shortly thereafter constructed a road across Tabbytite's land without obtaining a grant of easement from either Tabbytite or the United States. Although Clarke was successful in securing his homestead patent and began to subdivide his land for development purposes, the application of Tabbytite (contested by Clarke) was never accepted. In 1966, therefore, the homestead application was finally abandoned and Tabbytite elected instead to take the land as an Indian trust allotment.
After several unsuccessful attempts to bar persons from utilizing the road that crossed her land, Tabbytite turned to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In 1969 the United States, as holder of the legal title to the allotment, filed an action in federal district court, seeking damages and to enjoin further use of the road. The district court, in an unreported opinion, held that the road constituted an easement of necessity and denied the injunction. 8 This decision was subsequently reversed and remanded by the Ninth Circuit on the ground that no easement had arisen because, at the time of her entry, Tabbytite's title was good against everyone except the United States, and because Clarke was not a successor in interest to any easement implicitly retained by the government." 8 On remand, the municipality of Anchorage, which had annexed the area in 1975 and since that time had maintained the road, entered the proceedings and opposed the injunction request, arguing that by maintaining the road it had already effectively exercised its power of eminent domain by "inverse condemnation." 90 The district court agreed with the municipality, rejecting the government's position that section 357 does not authorize inverse condemnation. The court instead held that a taking did in fact occur at the time of annexation and that Tabbytite was "limited to an action for compensation resulting from inverse 87. The factual summary is drawn in large part from the dissenting opinion in [Vol. 10
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condemnation."'"I The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the subsequent appeal.
92
The United States Supreme Court thereupon granted the government's petition for certiorari to decide the issue of whether section 357 authorizes state or local governments to "condemn" individual Indian trust allotments by resort to the process of inverse condemnation. 3 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that section 357 does not authorize condemnation by physical occupation-the essence of inverse condemnation-but instead requires a formal judicial proceeding instituted by the condemning authority in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. 9 4
Rationale of Clarke
In deciding that section 357 does not extend to a taking by inverse condemnation as well as by the affirmative exercise of the eminent domain power, the Court emphasized the "important legal and practical differences between an inverse condemnation suit and a condemnation proceeding." 95 The term "inverse condemnation" is a popular description of the landowner's cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property taken by the physical intrusion 96 of the defendant where no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted. 97 A condemnation proceeding, as the Court points out, is by contrast "commonly understood to be an action brought by a condemning authority. .. .
In addition to the legal distinctions between condemnation suits and inverse condemnation actions, the Court noted two important practical differences. Initially, it observed that in the in- verse condemnation situation, where the condemning authority has not instituted legal action but instead has "taken" the land by physical occupation, the burden of taking affirmative action to recover just compensation is shifted to the landowner. 9 9 Placing the initiative on the landowner, the government argued, creates serious problems with respect to allotted lands because it "imposes a substantial burden on the United States, as trustee, to discover and challenge action that may constitute a taking of allotted lands." 1 '
The difficulty of discovering possible takings gives rise to the second practical difference between condemnation and inverse condemnation actions. It is well-settled that the value of property taken by a governmental body is ascertained as of the date of taking. 10 ' Hence, in a condemnation proceeding, where the taking is generally held to have occurred sometime during the course of the proceeding, the allottee's compensation is based on the current value of the land." 2 On the other hand, in the inverse condemnation situation, "the usual rule is that the time of the invasion constitutes the act of taking, and '[i]t is that event which gives rise to the claim for compensation and fixes the date as of which the land is to be valued ...... ,03 Obviously, if takings of allotted lands by inverse condemnation are to be allowed, there will be significant delays between the time the state takes possession and the time the landowners institute legal action, resulting in significant discrepancies in the amounts of the compensation awards.'" 99. 445 U.S. at 257. 100. Id., Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 17. In its brief, the government points out that prompt discovery of trespasses by state and local governments would be difficult in light of the "thousands of scattered Indian allotments," the proportionated ownership of the allotments by nonresident Indians, and the absence of a requirement that the allottee reside on the allotted lands or make use of them. Id. at 17-18 (quoting Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 374 (1968)).
Furthermore, an argument has been made that taking property without notifying the landowner under such circumstances "constitutes a blatant violation of the procedural due process that is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 104. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 100, at 16. The Brief goes on to point out that the greater the length of the delay, the more inadequate the award will be [Vol. 10
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In lighi of these legal and practical differences, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and held that "when § 357 authorizes the condemnation of lands pursuant to the laws of a State or Territory, the term 'condemned' refers not to an action by a landowner to recover compensation for a taking, but to a formal condemnation proceeding instituted by the condemning authority."°0 5 Because the "indispensable prerequisite" of a formal condemnation action was lacking, the federal grant of permission to condemn allotted Indian lands contained in section 357 could not be relied upon in this instance.' 6
Right-of-Way Statutes and Section 357
The Court in Clarke did not address the question of whether the specific provisions for acquiring rights-of-way across allotted Indian lands' 7 preclude states from obtaining such rights-of-way by condemnation under section 357.108 The question can be further divided into two related but separate issues: (1) whether section 357 when enacted encompassed condemnation of rights-ofway, and (2) whether subsequently enacted right-of-way statutes, particularly the 1948 Indian Right of Way Act, effected a partial implied repeal of section 357 to the extent it had applied to rightsof-way.' 0 9 These issues have produced two different interpretations of the interplay of the statutory and administrative schemes in the area of Indian allotted lands. Under one interpretation, generally advocated by the Indians, 1 0 the ostensible absolute to compensate the allottee. Id. at 18. For example, in Clarke, it is claimed that the taking occurred either in 1961, when the unincorporated city of Glen Alps began to maintain the road, or in 1975, when Anchorage annexed Glen Alps and assumed maintenance operations. If the award granted is based on either date, the government states, it will be only a fraction of the property's present value, given the rapid escalation of real estate values in the area. Id. at 16. The end result, it is argued, is that an expressed federal Indian policy will be contravened: "The consequence is that the policy of the Act of June 30, 1932, 25 U.S.C. § 409a-which authorizes the Secretary to reinvest the allottee's condemnation award in other lands-will be frustrated, since it will not be possible to purchase equivalent lands for the amount of the award." Id. at 17.
105. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 258.
106.
Id. at 259.
107.
See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text. 108. This issue was raised for the first time in the Intervenor's Brief. See Brief for Intervenor, supra note 100, at 9-30.
109. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 622 n.109. 110. Although this interpretation has been consistently advocated by the Indians, the United States has switched its position and now follows the view that the right-of-way statutes and section 357 constitute alternative acquisition methods. Compare United 
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general right of condemnation granted to states by section 357 is in reality modified by the enactment of the various right-of-way statutes, which control when applicable and require that the administrative regulations of the Secretary of the Interior be followed. Under the other interpretation, generally advocated by the states, the right-of-way statutes, with their accompanying regulations, and section 357, with its judicial features, constitute alternative methods authorized by Congress for the acquisition of rights-of-way by states across allotted lands. The courts, in attempting to resolve these issues, have focused primarily on the legislative histories of the statutes in question, the pertinent maxims of statutory construction, and the current congressional policies toward Indians.
Section 357 and the Right-of-Way Statutes as Alternative Acquisition Methods Available to States
The [Vol. 10 a different allotment came a year later to the Eighth Circuit. In that case, United States v. Minnesota, ' the court of appeals reversed itself and held that "each of these sections [sections 311 and 357] is an effective and reasonable provision in the procedure for the acquisition of a right of way, neither dependent upon the other." ", 6 In support of this abrupt reversal, the court stated that its previous decision had rested in large part on the mistaken belief that an earlier Fourth Circuit decision," 7 which held that the right-of-way in question had to be acquired pursuant to the applicable right-of-way statute, involved allotted rather than tribal lands."'
The cases that have subsequently addressed the "alternative methods" question have for the most part held that the right-ofway statutes are not the exclusive means by which states may ob- right-of-way statutes and section 357 constitute alternative acquisition methods. In Transok Pipeline Co., the court offered the following rationale for its position: "Undoubtedly Congress considered the safeguards available in federal judicial proceedings to be sufficient so that the permission of the Secretary was not required."' 28 The court's observation that Congress was cognizant of the judicial safeguards inherent in section 357 condemnation actions responds to the primary argument raised for the exclusivity of the right-of-way statutes, i.e., that by interpreting section 357 to encompass condemnation of rights-of-way across allotted lands, the states will be allowed to circumvent the right-of-way statutes and regulations. This argument focuses on the following maxims of statutory construction:
(1) Specific terms prevail over general terms in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling;'
29
(2) Statutes should be construed so that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant; 30 and (3) Statutes passed for the benefit of Indians are to be liberally construed with doubtful expressions being resolved in their favor.' 3 '
By holding that Congress considered the safeguards available in a judicial condemnation proceeding to be a sufficient substitute for the regulations promulgated under the right-of-way statutes, the court in Transok Pipeline Co. implicitly found that Congress was aware that, by authorizing states to condemn rights-of-way under section 357, the possibility existed that states would elect to bypass the administrative scheme for obtaining As we view the statutes governing acquisition of rights of way over Indian lands contained in 25 U.S.C. § § 311-328, they constitute a comprehensive scheme which completely covers the subject of rights of way. Sections 311-322 permit grants of right of way for specific purposes; sections 323-328 permit grants of right of way for all purposes while preserving the sections applicable to specific purposes....
The protection afforded by sections 311-328 would be nullified by the continued validity of the Act of May 10, 1926, which permits condemnation suits at any time for any public purpose without the consent of the Secretary or the Indians.... 
See
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This plain inconsistency with the later statutes leads to the inescapable conclusion that the 1926 Act has been repealed by implication. [Vol. 10 intent.' 4 7 In addition to relying on Pueblo of Laguna, the Indian allottees in Yellowfish argued that condemnation of rights-of-way under section 357 conflicts with the current congressional policy toward Indians. The assimilation policy in force at the time of the passage of section 357 was repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act. Both the Indian Reorganization Act and the Indian Right of Way Act, it is argued, evince a policy of preventing the alienation or transfer of allotted lands without consent, and section 357 therefore should be deemed repealed to the extent it conflicts with this policy.' 4 8
The court did not find the shift in congressional policy to be persuasive evidence of an implied repeal of section 357. In support of this holding, the court noted that in 1976, in a statute passed to repeal the 1926 Act at issue in Pueblo of Laguna, Congress included a provision amending the 1928 Act to extend section 357 to the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico.' 49 The continued application of section 357 in face of the current congressional policy may also be explained by the tribal/allotted land distinction used to distinguish Yellowfish from Pueblo of Laguna: whereas the Indian Reorganization Act's strong policy of maintaining the tribal land base supports the view that the 1926 Act authorizing condemnation of communally owned Pueblo land should be deemed repealed in light of the Indian Right of Way Act, the Indian Reorganization Act's policy toward allotments is less strong and may not overcome the presumption against implied repeals. As noted by the court in Yellowfish, although the Indian Reorganization Act prohibited further allotment of reservation land in order to protect the tribal land base, existing allotments remained in effect and allotments were still allowed to be made to Indians not residing on reservations.1 5 0
The argument that the shift in congressional policy away from assimilation supports the view that section 357 was implicitly repealed by the 1948 Indian Right of Way Act was also recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Southern California Edison Co. v. Rice.' 51 The condemning authority in Rice sought to obtain a right-of-way under section 357 for electrical transmission lines over allotted lands. In upholding the right of the condemning authority to proceed under section 357, the court found that Congress, with respect to state condemnation actions, chose "to have Indian allottees remain in virtually the same position as those who privately own land for their sole use and benefit ... ,,1S2
The court's analysis of the effect of the change in congressional policy toward Indians followed the analysis of the Tenth Circuit In reaching its decision that section 357 cannot be used to condemn rights-of-way,' 56 the district court either distinguished or disagreed with the body of case law that has held otherwise.' 7 The 155. Id. at 600. In support of its holding that section 357 has been partially superseded, the district court cited the maxim of statutory construction, which states that statutes passed for the benefit of Indians are to be liberally construed in favor of Indians. Id. at 597. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. The court also stressed the shift in federal policy from assimilation to "preservation of the Indians' land base and the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency . . . ." Id. This new federal policy, the court held, was embodied in the 1948 Indian Rights of Way Act, which the court found "was intended to satisfy the need for simplification and uniformity in the administration of easements over the various categories of Indian lands." Id. 
